Scotuscast

On April 4, 2016, the Supreme Court decided Evenwel v. Abbott. As required by the Texas Constitution, the Texas legislature reapportioned its senate districts after the publication of the 2010 census, formally adopting an interim plan that had been put in place for the 2012 primaries. Plaintiffs, who are registered Texas voters, sued the Texas governor and secretary of state, asserting that the redistricting plan violated the one-person, one-vote principle of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, by failing to apportion districts to equalize both total population and voter population. A three-judge district court ruled in favor of the state officials. -- On appeal, the question before the Supreme Court was whether the three-judge district court correctly held that the “one-person, one-vote” principle under the Equal Protection Clause allows States to use total population, and does not require States to use voter population when apportioning state legislative districts. -- By a vote of 8-0, t

On April 27, 2016, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in McDonnell v. United States. Robert F. McDonnell, former Governor of Virginia, was convicted in a jury trial of eleven counts of corruption. During the trial, prosecutors sought to prove that McDonnell and his wife Maureen while he was Governor, accepted money and lavish gifts in exchange for efforts to assist a Virginia company in securing state university testing of a dietary supplement the company had developed. The McDonnells, prosecutors argued, took “official action” on behalf of the company in exchange for money, campaign contributions, or other things of value, in violation of various federal statutes. Robert McDonnell was sentenced to two years in prison. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed McDonnell’s conviction, but the U.S. Supreme Court granted his request to remain out of prison until the Court resolves his appeal. -- The question before the Supreme Court is whether “official action” under the controlling fraud

On April 18, 2016, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in United States v. Texas. This case relates back to the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) 2012 Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program, which set forth special criteria to direct how DHS should exercise prosecutorial discretion in enforcing federal immigration laws against certain young persons. In 2014 DHS issued a memo that then expanded eligibility under DACA and directed establishment of a similar program for the parents of DACA-eligible persons: Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents (DAPA). -- Twenty-six states sued in federal district court to prevent the DHS from implementing DAPA, arguing that DAPA violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) because it had not gone through a notice-and-comment process, and was moreover arbitrary and capricious. The states also argued that DAPA abrogated the President’s constitutional duty to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” The distri

On April 25, 2016, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC v. Lee. In 2011 the America Invents Act created an expedited procedure, known as inter partes review, to provide a cost-effective alternative to litigation for resolving certain challenges to patent validity. The Patent Trial and Appeal Board, contained within the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO), hears these disputes rather than a federal district court. When construing patent claims, the Board applies a “broadest reasonable interpretation” standard rather than the “plain and ordinary meaning” standard typically applied by federal courts. -- Here, Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC. (Cuozzo) owns a speed limit indicator patent. Garmin International, Inc. (Garmin) petitioned the Board for inter partes review (IPR) of claims regarding the patent. The Board found that certain claims were unpatentable, and denied Cuozzo’s request to replace those claims with several others. Cuozzo appealed the Board’s decision to the

On April 25, 2016, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons. Academic textbook publisher John Wiley & Sons, Inc. (Wiley) owns the American copyright for textbooks and often assigns its rights to its foreign subsidiaries to publish, print, and sell its textbooks abroad. Supap Kirtsaeng, a Thai citizen who came to the United States in 1997 to study mathematics, asked friends and family in Thailand to buy the English-language versions of his textbooks in Thailand, where they were cheaper and mail them to him. Kirtsaeng would then sell these textbooks in America, reimburse his friends and family, and make a profit. -- In 2008, Wiley sued Kirtsaeng for copyright infringement. He ultimately prevailed before the U.S. Supreme Court on the question whether the “first sale” doctrine--under which the owner of a “lawfully made” copy can dispose of it without permission of the copyright owner--applies to copies of a copyrighted work lawfully made abroad. On remand, the U.S. Court o

On January 12, 2016, the Supreme Court decided Bruce v. Samuels. The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 provides that those prisoners qualified to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) must nonetheless pay an initial partial filing fee, set as “20 percent of the greater of” the average monthly deposits in the prisoner’s account or the average monthly balance of the account over the preceding six months. They must then pay the remainder of the fee in monthly installments of “20 percent of the preceding month’s income credited to the prisoner’s account.” The initial partial fee is assessed on a per-case basis, i.e., each time the prisoner files a lawsuit. This case involves a dispute over the calculation of subsequent monthly installment payments when more than one fee is owed. Petitioner Antoine Bruce, a federal inmate, contends that he should only have to pay 20 percent of his monthly income without regard to the number of cases filed for which fees are owed. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia

On March 1, 2016, the Supreme Court decided Lockhart v. United States. Petitioner Avondale Lockhart pleaded guilty to possessing child pornography. Because Lockhart had a prior state-court conviction for first-degree sexual abuse involving his adult girlfriend, his presentence report concluded that he was subject to a 10-year mandatory minimum sentence enhancement, which is triggered by prior state convictions for crimes “relating to aggravated sexual abuse, sexual abuse, or abusive sexual conduct involving a minor or ward.” Lockhart argued that the limiting phrase “involving a minor or ward” applied to all three state crimes, so his prior conviction did not trigger the enhancement. Disagreeing, the District Court applied the mandatory minimum. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. -- By a vote of 6-2, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Second Circuit. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the Court, holding that the phrase “involving a minor or ward” in §2252(b)(2

On February 29, 2016, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Williams v. Pennsylvania. Terrance Williams was convicted and sentenced to death for the robbery and murder of Amos Norwood. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed Williams’ conviction and sentence, and his initial attempts to obtain state postconviction relief failed. His subsequent petition for federal habeas relief also failed. He again sought post-conviction penalty-related relief in state court and prevailed in the Court of Common Pleas on a claim of unlawful evidence suppression. On appeal, however, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the grant of relief and lifted the stay of execution (though a temporary reprieve was later granted by the governor for other reasons). The Chief Justice of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, Ronald Castille--who had joined the opinion reversing the grant of relief to Williams--had also been the District Attorney for Philadelphia during Williams’ trial, sentencing, and appeal. In that capacity, Castille

On April 18, 2016, the Supreme Court decided Welch v. United States. Gregory Welch pleaded guilty to the charge of being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of federal law. Because Welch had three prior felony convictions, the district court determined that the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) required that he be sentenced to a minimum of 15 years in prison. Welch appealed, arguing that his conviction for robbery in Florida state court did not qualify as a predicate offense for the purposes of ACCA because, at the time he was convicted, Florida state law allowed for a robbery conviction with a lower level of force than the federal law required to qualify as a predicate offense. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, however, affirmed the district court’s judgment, concluding that the minimum elements for conviction under the Florida law established a “serious risk of physical injury to another” and therefore qualified it as a predicate offense for purposes of ACCA. Welch’s subsequent

On January 20, 2016, the Supreme Court decided three consolidated death penalty cases: Kansas v. Carr, a second Kansas v. Carr, and Kansas v. Gleason. -- A Kansas jury sentenced Sidney Gleason to death for killing a co-conspirator and her boyfriend to cover up the robbery of an elderly man. In a joint proceeding, a Kansas jury also sentenced brothers Reginald and Jonathan Carr to death for a crime spree that culminated in the brutal rape, robbery, kidnapping, and execution-style shooting of five young men and women. The Supreme Court of Kansas vacated the death sentences in each case, holding that the sentencing instructions violated the Eighth Amendment by failing “to affirmatively inform the jury that mitigating circumstances need only be proved to the satisfaction of the individual juror in that juror’s sentencing decision and not beyond a reasonable doubt.” It also held that the Carrs’ Eighth Amendment right “to an individualized capital sentencing determination” was violated by the trial court’s failur

On March 30, 2016, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in United States Army Corps of Engineers v. Hawkes Co., Inc. Hawkes Co. (Hawkes) applied to the Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) for a Clean Water Act permit to begin extracting peat from wetlands in northern Minnesota it was preparing to purchase. After attempting to discourage the purchase, and initiating various administrative processes, the Corps ultimately issued an Approved Jurisdictional Determination (Approved JD) asserting that the wetland contained waters of the United States, thereby creating a substantial barrier to development by Hawkes. Hawkes filed suit in federal district court to challenge the Approved JD, arguing that it conflicted with the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation of jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act. The district court dismissed the suit on the grounds that the Approved JD was not a “final agency action” as defined by the Administrative Procedure Act, and therefore not yet subject to judicial review. The U.S. Court of

On March 23, 2016, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Zubik v. Burwell, the lead case in a consolidated series, with the other petitioners including Priests for Life, Southern Nazarene University, Geneva College, Roman Catholic Archbishop of Washington, East Texas Baptist University, and Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged. -- The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA) requires that group health plans and health insurance issuers provide coverage for women’s “preventative care,” or face financial penalties. Although the ACA does not define preventative care, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), relying on the Institute of Medicine, determined that the term encompassed, among other things, all FDA-approved contraceptive methods, including drugs and devices that could induce an abortion. Although the government exempted “religious employers” from this mandate, the exemption was narrowly defined and did not extend to petitioners. The government did, however,

On March 21, 2016, the Supreme Court decided Caetano v. Massachusetts without oral argument. -- Jamie Caetano was convicted of violating a Massachusetts law prohibiting possession of stun guns. On appeal, she claimed this law violated the Second Amendment, by infringing her right to possess a stun gun in public for the purpose of self-defense from an abusive ex-boyfriend. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts affirmed Caetano’s conviction, ruling that stun guns are not eligible for Second Amendment protection. -- By a vote of 8-0, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a per curiam opinion vacating the judgment of the Massachusetts court and remanding the case. Citing its 2008 precedent District of Columbia v. Heller, and its 2010 precedent McDonald v. Chicago, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the Massachusetts court’s decision as contradictory of Supreme Court precedent. Justice Alito filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Thomas joined. -- To discuss the case, we have Nelson Lund, who is University

On March 29, 2016, the Supreme Court decided Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association. A group of public school employees sued the California Teachers Association and various other entities, arguing that the agency shop arrangement itself--as well as the opt-out requirement--violated the First Amendment. The district court denied their claim and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed based on existing precedent and the 1997 Supreme Court decision Abood v. Detroit Board of Education. The two questions before the Supreme Court were (1) whether the Abood precedent should be overruled and public-sector “agency shop” arrangements invalidated under the First Amendment; and (2) whether it violates the First Amendment to require that public employees affirmatively object to subsidizing nonchargeable speech by public-sector unions, rather than requiring that employees affirmatively consent to subsidizing such speech. -- In a one-sentence per curiam opinion, the judgment of the Ninth Circuit wa

On March 21, 2016, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. The European Community. The European Community and 26 of its member states sued RJR Nabisco (RJR) in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York, alleging that RJR conducted a global money-laundering enterprise in violation of several laws, including the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), a federal statute. The alleged RICO enterprise involved the importation of illegal drugs into European countries by Colombian and Russian criminal organizations, with RJR helping to launder their drug money through a cigarette import-purchase scheme. Applying a presumption against extraterritorial application of federal law, the district court dismissed The European Community’s civil RICO claim. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated that judgment and reinstated the RICO claim, however, concluding that various alleged predicates for RICO liability had been intended by Congress to apply e

On March 28, 2016, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Betterman v. Montana. Brandon Thomas Betterman pled to and was sentenced for the offense of bail-jumping. He argued on appeal that a 14-month delay between the entry of his guilty plea and his sentencing violated his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. The Supreme Court of Montana affirmed Betterman’s conviction and sentence, holding that the constitutional right to a speedy trial does not extend from conviction to sentencing. A criminal defendant still retains, the court concluded, a Fourteenth Amendment due process right to have sentence imposed in a timely manner, without unreasonable delay--and the delay in this case was unacceptable--but any resulting prejudice to Betterman was speculative and not substantial and demonstrable. -- The U.S. Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari on the following issue: whether the Sixth Amendment’s Speedy Trial Clause applies to the sentencing phase of a criminal prosecution, protecting a criminal de

On April 4, 2016, the Supreme Court decided Nichols v. United States. Petitioner Nichols, a registered sex offender who moved from Kansas to the Philippines without updating his registration, was arrested, escorted to the United States, and charged with violating the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA). SORNA makes it a federal crime for certain sex offenders to “knowingly fai[l] to register or update a registration,” and requires that offenders who move to a different State “shall, not later than 3 business days after each change of name, residence, employment, or student status,” inform in person “at least 1 jurisdiction involved . . . of all changes” to required information. After conditionally pleading guilty, Nichols argued on appeal that SORNA did not require him to update his registration in Kansas. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed his conviction. -- By a vote of 8-0 the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Tenth Circuit, holding that SORNA did not req

On March 30, 2016, the Supreme Court decided Luis v. U.S. In 2012, a grand jury indicted Luis for a variety of crimes relating to health care fraud. The government contended that she had fraudulently obtained some $45 million, and had spent all except $2 million of it. The government then initiated a civil proceeding to freeze Luis’ remaining assets, including those not traceable to the alleged fraud, to preserve them for payment of restitution and criminal penalties if she was convicted. Luis objected that the freeze violated her Sixth Amendment right to counsel, by precluding her from using her own untainted funds--those not connected with the alleged crime--to hire counsel to defend her in her criminal case. The district court acknowledged that Luis might be unable to hire counsel of her choice but rejected her Sixth Amendment claim, and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed that judgment on appeal. -- By a vote of 5-3, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the 11th Circuit and remanded the case. No single r

On February 22, 2016, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in CRST Van Expedited, Inc. v. EEOC. In 2007, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed a sexual harassment suit against CRST Van Expedited (CRST) on behalf of approximately 270 female employees. When a number failed to appear for depositions, however, the district court barred the EEOC from pursuing their claims as a discovery sanction. The remaining claims were dismissed on various other grounds, including 67 claims that the district court dismissed for failure of the EEOC to separately investigate, find reasonable cause for, or attempt to conciliate them. In addition, the court awarded CRST some $4.46 million in attorney’s fees and expenses, on the basis that the claims were frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation. On appeal the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of all but two claims, vacated the award of fees and costs, and remanded the case. On remand, one of the remaining claims was withd

On March 7, 2016, the Supreme Court decided V.L. v. E.L., a case involving an interstate dispute over custody of a child raised by a same-sex couple. A Georgia court entered a final judgment of adoption making petitioner V. L. a legal parent of the children that she and respondent E. L., her same-sex partner, had raised together from birth. V. L. and E. L. later separated while living in Alabama. V. L. asked the Alabama courts to enforce the Georgia judgment and grant her custody or visitation rights. The Alabama Supreme Court refused, holding that the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution did not require the Alabama courts to respect the Georgia judgment. -- By a vote of 8-0 the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Alabama Supreme Court and remanded the case, holding in a per curiam opinion that the Alabama Supreme Court erred in refusing to grant the Georgia adoption judgment full faith and credit. -- To discuss the case, we have Robin Fretwell Wilson, who is the Roge