Scotuscast

This SCOTUScast addresses the January 22 Supreme Court argument in Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue. The question, in this case, is whether it violates the Free Exercise Clause for a state supreme court to invalidate a school choice program, merely because that program includes religious options, pursuant to that state’s Blaine Amendment. The Institute for Justice represents the Plaintiffs in the case. To discuss the case, we have Erica Smith, Senior Attorney at the Institute for Justice.

On April 20, 2020, the Supreme Court, by a vote of 7-2, held that owners of polluted land within designated Superfund sites are “potentially responsible parties” under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA). Dozens of Montana landowners sued Atlantic Richfield for trespass and nuisance over its dumping of tons of heavy metals, arsenic, and lead on their properties—pollution which led EPA to designate a 300 square mile area as a Superfund site. In addition to compensation, the landowners sought remediation damages to pay for a cleanup beyond that previously ordered by EPA. Chief Justice John Roberts, writing for the majority, concluded that the landowners’ case cannot proceed until they first obtain EPA approval for their cleanup plan. That narrow holding sidestepped the thornier issue, whether CERCLA preempts the landowners’ state common law claims. Justices Gorsuch and Thomas dissented, arguing that the majority’s interpretation

On May 18, 2020, the Supreme Court held by a vote of 8-0 that Plaintiffs in a suit against a foreign state for personal injury or death caused by acts of terrorism under 28 U. S. C. § 1605A(c) may seek punitive damages for pre-enactment conduct.Following the 1998 al Qaeda bombing of American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, victims and their families brought suit against the Republic of Sudan, alleging that it had assisted al Qaeda in carrying out the attacks. In doing so, plaintiffs invoked a terrorism exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA)--but there was uncertainty as to whether, even in the absence of an immunity bar, Congress had provided a federal cause of action for claimants such as plaintiffs. In 2008, however, Congress amended FSIA to provide an express cause of action and directed that claims such as plaintiffs’ be treated “as if ” they had been originally filed under the new cause of action. Congress also made punitive damages available under the new cau

On May 6, 2020, the U.S. Supreme Court heard argument in Barr v. American Association of Political Consultants Inc., a case involving a dispute over whether the government-debt exception to the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991’s automated-call restriction violates the First Amendment, and whether the proper remedy for any constitutional violation is to sever the exception from the remainder of the statute.To discuss the case, we have Kevin Walsh, Professor of Law at the University of Richmond School of Law.As always, the Federalist Society takes no particular legal or public policy positions. All opinions expressed are those of the speakers.

Three cases before the Supreme Court consider the ability of grand juries and congressional committees to subpoena the personal tax records of the President. In Trump v. Mazars USA and Trump v. Deutsche Bank, three House committees subpoenaed the President’s tax records. In Trump v. Vance, a local grand jury has subpoenaed these tax documents as well. There are several issues at play in determining if these subpoenas are valid. The Supreme Court has also asked the parties to brief whether these congressional subpoenas are the kind of dispute between the branches that the court should avoid.To discuss the case, we have Devin Watkins, Attorney at the Competitive Enterprise Institute.As always, the Federalist Society takes no particular legal or public policy positions. All opinions expressed are those of the speakers.

On April 27, 2020, the Supreme Court held by a vote of 8-1, in the case Maine Community Health Options v. United States, that The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act’s now-expired “Risk Corridors” statute—which set a formula for calculating payments to healthcare insurers for unexpectedly unprofitable plans during the first three years of online insurance marketplaces—created a government obligation to pay insurers the full amount of their computed losses; and the petitioners properly relied on the Tucker Act to sue for damages in the Court of Federal Claims.The judgment reversed and remanded the case to the courts below. The opinion was written by Justice Sotomayor on April 27, 2020. Justices Thomas and Gorsuch joined the court's opinion except for Part III-C. Justice Alito filed a dissenting opinion.To discuss the case, we have Julia Mahoney, Professor of Law at the University of Virginia School of Law.

On May 11, 2020, the U.S. Supreme Court heard argument in the consolidated cases Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru and St. James School v. Biel, which involves a dispute over whether the First Amendment's religion clauses prevent civil courts from adjudicating employment-discrimination claims brought by an employee against her religious employer when the employee carried out important religious functions.In 2012, the case Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, the Supreme Court, unanimously held that, under the First Amendment’s Religion Clauses, “it is impermissible for the government to contradict a church’s determination of who can act as its ministers.” Accordingly, the Court recognized that there is a “ministerial exception” that precludes the application of employment-discrimination laws to claims concerning the relationship between a religious institution and its ministers. But who qualifies as a minister? The Hosanna-Tabor Cou

On Feb. 24, 2020, the U.S. Supreme Court heard argument in Opati v. Republic of Sudan, a case involving a dispute over whether the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act authorizes punitive damages for terrorist activities that took place before Congress amended the statute to provide an express cause of action contemplating such damages. Following the 1998 al Qaeda bombing of American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, victims and their families brought suit against the Republic of Sudan, alleging that it had assisted al Qaeda in carrying out the attacks. In doing so, plaintiffs invoked a terrorism exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA)--but there was uncertainty as to whether, even in the absence of an immunity bar, Congress had provided a federal cause of action for claimants such as plaintiffs. In 2008, however, Congress amended FSIA to provide an express cause of action and directed that claims such as plaintiffs’ be treated “as if ” they had been originally filed under the

On April 27, 2020, the U.S. Supreme Court released its opinion in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association Inc. v. City of New York, a case involving a dispute over whether New York City rules limiting transportation of licensed firearms to ranges within New York City limits (and certain state-designated hunting areas) violate the Second Amendment, the dormant Commerce Clause, and the constitutional right to travel.Under New York state law, possessing a firearm without a license is prohibited. New York City issues “premises” licenses that permit possession of a pistol or revolver at a particular address, and under city “Rule 5-23” such firearms may not be lawfully removed from that address except for transport directly to or from authorized shooting ranges within New York City limits (as well as certain state-designated hunting areas). Plaintiffs, who hold New York City premises licenses, wished to transport their firearms to shooting ranges, competitions, and/or homes outside o

On May 7, 2020, the Supreme Court released the decision in United States v. Sineneng-Smith. By a vote of 9-0, the judgment of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was vacated and the case remanded. Although every member of the Court joined Justice Ginsburg's opinion, Justice Thomas also issued a concurring opinion indicating his doubt about the validity of the overbreadth doctrine. To discuss the cases, we have Brian M. Fish, Special Assistant, United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland.As always, the Federalist Society takes no particular legal or public policy positions. All opinions expressed are those of the speakers.

On May 5, 2020, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in United States Agency for Int’l Development v. Alliance for Open Society Int’l, Inc., a case which considers whether the First Amendment bars enforcement of a funding-related federal policy requirement not only against domestic organizations but also their foreign affiliates.The United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003 authorized the appropriation of billions of dollars to fund efforts by nongovernmental organizations to combat HIV/AIDS around the world. The Act provides, however, that none of these funds may be used by an organization “that does not have a policy explicitly opposing prostitution and sex trafficking.” 22 U.S.C. §7631(f). In its 2013 decision in Agency for Int’l Dev. v. Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., the Supreme Court held that this “Policy Requirement” violated the First Amendment, by compelling as a condition of federal funding the

On May 4, 2020, the U.S. Supreme Court heard argument in United States Patent and Trademark Office v. Booking.com B.V., a case presenting the question whether the addition by an online business of a generic top-level domain (“.com”) to an otherwise generic term can create a protectable trademark.In 2011 and 2012, Booking.com sought trademark protection for its web address name, “Booking.com”--but the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) rejected the application. “Booking” was either generic and not protectable, the PTO stated, or else a descriptive mark to which the addition of “.com” was insufficient to demonstrate the “secondary meaning” necessary for federal protection of a descriptive mark. Booking.com filed a civil action in federal district court to appeal the PTO rejection and prevailed: the district court held that “Booking.com” as a whole was a descriptive mark that had acquired secondary meaning; that is, it was sufficiently

On Feb. 26, 2020, in a 9-0 decision, the Supreme Court decided Shular v. United States, rejecting the defense argument that Florida’s unique drug laws cannot be used to enhance a federal sentence. At issue was a federal statute known as the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”). ACCA imposes a mandatory 15-year sentence on defendants convicted of federal firearms-related felonies if they have 3 or more prior convictions for “serious drug offenses” or “violent felonies.” In 2017, local law enforcement officers executed a search warrant at the Florida home of Eddie Shular who was the target of a drug trafficking investigation being conducted by the Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”). During the search, the officers seized a firearm from a bedroom closet. Because Shular was a convicted felon, he was charged under federal law with the crime of being a felon in possession of a firearm (18 USC section 922(g)(1)). He pled guilty to that offense and becau

On April 23, 2020, in a 9-0 decision, the Supreme Court decided Romag Fasteners Inc. v. Fossil Inc., holding that a plaintiff in a trademark infringement suit is not required to show that a defendant willfully infringed the plaintiff’s trademark as a precondition to an award of profits.The decision, which vacated and remanded the opinion below from the Federal Circuit, was written by Justice Gorsuch on April 23, 2020. Justice Alito filed a concurring opinion, in which Justices Breyer and Kagan joined. Justice Sotomayor filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.To discuss the case, we have Adam Mossoff, Professor of Law at Antonin Scalia Law School, George Mason University. As always, the Federalist Society takes no particular legal or public policy positions. All opinions expressed are those of the speakers.

On Feb. 25, 2020, in a vote of 9-0 the U.S. Supreme Court decided Monasky v. Taglieri, holding that a child’s habitual residence under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction depends on the totality of the circumstances specific to the case, not on categorical requirements such as an actual agreement between the parents.The Hague Convention, and the federal law that implements it in the United States, indicate that a parent whose child has been removed to another country in violation of that parent’s custodial rights can petition in federal or state court for the return of the child to the child’s country of habitual residence. The courts of that country can then resolve any underlying custody disputes. The opinion was given by Justice Ginsburg. Justice Thomas joined as to Parts I, III and IV, and filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Justice Alito filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.To discuss

On April 23, 2020, in a 6-3 decision, the Supreme Court decided County of Maui, Hawai’i v. Hawai’i Wildlife Fund and vacated and remanded the case. The Court held that the Clean Water Act, which forbids “any addition” of any pollutant from “any point source” to “navigable waters” without the appropriate Environmental Protection Agency permit, requires a permit when there is a direct discharge from a point source into navigable waters or when there is the functional equivalent of a direct discharge.Under the federal Clean Water Act (CWA), someone seeking to discharge a pollutant from a “point source,” such as a pipe or well, into navigable water must first obtain a permit via the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System program (NPDES). The County of Maui, Hawai’i (the County), owns and operates four wells at a wastewater treatment plant that processes several million gallons of sewage per day. Treated wastewater from the plant is injec

On April 23, 2020, in a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court decided Barton v. Barr, a case involving a dispute over whether, for the purposes of the “stop-time rule,” a lawfully admitted permanent resident who is not seeking admission to the United States can be “render[ed] ... inadmissible”. The stop-time rule affects the discretion afforded the U.S. Attorney General to cancel the removal from the United States of a lawful permanent resident who has resided in the U.S. continuously for 7 years. Under the stop-time rule, the requisite continuous residence terminates once the alien commits any of a certain number of offenses that render the alien inadmissible to (or removable from) the United States under federal law. Thus, committing a listed offense may cause an alien to fall short of the continuous 7-year residence requirement and thereby become ineligible for cancellation of removal.Andre Martello Barton, after receiving lawful permanent resident status, was convicted in 1996 on three

On April 20, 2020, the Supreme Court released its decision in Thryv, Inc. v. Click-To-Call Technologies, LP holding that the Patent Office decision to hear an inter partes review (“IPR”) challenge is not subject to judicial review on time-bar grounds. The majority found that ruling otherwise would “unwind the agency’s merits decision” and “operate to save bad patent claims.”To discuss the case we have Daniel L. Geyser, Chair, Supreme Court and Appellate Practice, Geyser, P.C.As always, the Federalist Society takes no particular legal or public policy positions. All opinions expressed are those of the speakers.

On October 7, 2019, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Ramos v. Louisiana.In Ramos, Evangelisto Ramos was convicted of second-degree murder by the vote of 10 of 12 jurors. Challenging his conviction, Ramos argued that Louisiana’s statutory scheme permitting non-unanimous jury verdicts in non-capital felony cases violated his right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Relying on its precedent, the Louisiana Supreme Court rejected Ramos’ argument. The U.S. Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari to consider whether the Fourteenth Amendment fully incorporates the Sixth Amendment guarantee of a unanimous jury verdict (in criminal cases) against the states.In a vote of 6-3, the court reversed. Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the court with respect to Parts I, II–A, III, and IV–B–1, in which Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor and Kavanaugh joined; an opinion with respect to Parts II–B, 4–B–2, and 5, in

On March 3, 2020, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments for the case of Liu v. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). At issue is "whether the Securities and Exchange Commission may seek and obtain disgorgement from a court as “equitable relief” for a securities law violation even though the Supreme Court has determined that such disgorgement is a penalty." To discuss the case, we have Todd F. Braunstein, General Counsel - International, Willis Towers Watson.As always, the Federalist Society takes no particular legal or public policy positions. All opinions expressed are those of the speakers.